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Is Justice Relevant to the Law of War?*
George P. Fletcher+

I. INTRODUCTION

Intellectual work on the law of war suffers from chronic isolation.
The commentators on the Rome Statute are international lawyers who
pay no attention to the work either of theoretical criminal lawyers or of
the philosophers.' The philosophers-Jeff McMahan 2 as an outstanding
example-ignore the legal details that dominate the books of the
international lawyers. Criminal lawyers have much to contribute to the
discussion of international law, but they seem not to be interested.
Writers with limited audiences, living in closed worlds, are unaware of
what they have to learn from those with a different take on the field.
For a dramatic illustration of these differences in discourse,
consider the way in which McMahan positions his new book, The
Moralityand Law of War in the intellectual tradition. He thinks of his
work as part of "just war theory"-a discipline that supposedly dates
back to the Greeks, but found its finest expression in the Christian
writers from Saint Augustine to Thomas Aquinas.
After Michael
* This article first appeared in the IsraeliLaw Review, 40 ISR. L. REV. 684 (2007). All stylistic
changes reflect the preferences of the editorial staff of the Washburn Law Journal.
+ Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School. George P. Fletcher has
published over 100 scholarly articles and eleven books. The latest is Defending Humanity: When
Force Is Used and Justified (2008) (co-authored with Jens Ohlin). Other recent books include The
Grammar of Criminal Law- American, Comparative, and International(2007) and Our Secret
Constitution: How Lincoln Redefined American Democracy (2001), feted as the best book on law
published that year. His earlier prize-winners include A Crime of Self Defense: BernhardGoetz and
the Law on Trial(1988), which received the ABA Silver Gavel Award and Rethinking CriminalLaw
(Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1978), selected as one of the best books published on law in the late
1970s. Fletcher's work has been featured in special editions of the CardozoLaw Review(2007), the
Tulsa Law Review(2004), and the Notre Dame Law Review(2003). In 2004 Fletcher was elected to
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. A new book on torts and a novel about academia is
forthcoming.
1. See generallyANToNio CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2008); ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); OITrO TRIEFrERER, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (2d ed.

2008).
2. Jeff McMahan (Ph.D. Cambridge University, M.A. Oxford University) is Professor of
Philosophy at Rutgers University.
3. JEFF MCMAHAN, THE MORALITY AND LAW OF WAR: THE HOURANI LECTURES
(forthcoming). McMahan recently published an article which provides a "brief summary of the main
lines of [his] argument[s]" in his forthcoming work. See Jeff McMahan, Prdcis: The Morality and
Law of War,40 ISR. L. REV. 310,310 (2007).
4. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS, at xx (3d ed. 2000).
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Walzer revived the field with his book Just and Unjust Wars5 in 1977, a
cottage industry grew up around the notion of "just war theory." The
writers are philosophers who seem to be unaware that the judges of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or
the commentators on the International Criminal Court (ICC) would be
wary of referring to "just war theory." Even if the judges knew what
this philosophical theory was, it would strike them as irrelevant to the
legal analysis of jus ad bellum 6 and jus in bello.7 Perhaps they would be
right.
The thesis of this article is that while other principles of morality
apply, such as reciprocity and the responsibility of commanders and
soldiers for criminal acts, justice is not an appropriate consideration in
the law of war. Justice does have a particular domain, but that domain
does not intersect with the law of war.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE EFFECT

Sometimes moral principles haunt the law without the day-to-day
practitioners being aware of their source and influence. A good
example is the principle of double effect -invented, so far as I know, by
Aquinas to explain the structure of killing in self-defense.8 The basic
idea, which I will explore in depth later, is that the defender should not
intend to kill the aggressor but merely to avert the imminent and
unlawful attack. 9 If the aggressor is killed as a side-effect of selfdefense-and the killing is not disproportionate to the gravity of the
aggressor's attack-the killing is justified and free from legal taint.10
The same idea underlies the principle of distinctionin the international
criminal law, namely that it is impermissible to target civilians
intentionally, but civilians may be killed as the "collateral damage" of
attacks against military targets. 1 The only restraint-rarely applied in
practice-is that the loss of civilian life not be excessive or
disproportionate to the military target.1 2 In other words, commanders
must distinguish between combatants and civilians and target only

5. See generally id.
6. Jus ad bellum is the law regarding the rights of states to go to war. See, e.g., GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL

VOL. 1, at 333 (2007).

7. Jus in hello is the law of war. See, e.g., id at 333-34.
8. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS, 225-27 (William P. Baumgarth

& Richard J. Regan eds. 1988).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 88-94; see also Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome

Statute].
12.

Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(v).
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military targets and combatants.13 The damage to civilians may not be
intentional,14
Without the principle of double effect, it would be difficult to
articulate or indeed make sense of the principle of distinction. The
underlying moral principle is that you are tainted, first and foremost, by
direct intentional contact with evil. If you intend directly to kill a
human being, you are guilty of murder. If the death occurs as a side
effect, it is not charged to your account in the same way. Only if these
side effects are disproportionate to your good intention-averting the
attack or attacking military targets -are you guilty of wrongdoing.1 5
The following chart demonstrates the way in which the components
of self-defense and the principle of distinction correspond:
Intention

War

Self-Defense

Good intention

Attacking
military targets

Warding off the
attack

Bad intention

Killing civilians

Killing a human
being

This set of distinctions is fundamental both to the criminal law and
the law of war, and yet it is rarely discussed. The entire structure of the
Geneva Conventions is based on twin ideas: (1) that there are protected
persons such as prisoners of war, the sick, civilians, and other hors de
comba, 16 and (2) that it is unlawful to target protected persons
intentionally, but that they may be killed as the proportionate sideeffect of legitimate military activities.1 7 The relevant provision of the
Rome Statute makes it a crime to "[i]ntentionally launch[] an attack in
the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury
to civilians .. .which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated ....8 This

13. See id.
14. See id
15. Cf id.;
THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8.
16. See Geneva Convention [No. I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 3, 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention [No. III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War arts. 3,4, Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
17. See Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention [No. III] Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). The deleted portion of this provision
stipulates an additional form of harm, namely "damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated." Id.
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provision obviously bears the imprint of the Thomistic doctrine of
"double effect," but I have never seen the general principle mentioned
or evaluated in a legal work on the law of war.19 The principle of
distinction is accepted as a bedrock premise of the system. Its moral
justification does not seem to require discussion.
Interestingly, criminal lawyers generally accept the principle of
double effect in the law of self-defense, but reject it in the law of
homicide. For example, the German Penal Code Article 32(2) defines
legitimate self-defense as a "defense which is required to avert an
imminent unlawful attack against oneself or another. '2' The defender
must have a direct intention to thwart the attack; if so, it is permissible
to act with knowledge of a high probability that the action will result in
the death of the aggressor. The death of the aggressor would be, so to
speak, collateral damage because it was not the primary purpose of the
defensive act.
In contrast, killing with an oblique intention-as the side effect of
your real intention-is as bad as killing with a specific focus on the
victim. For example, if Oswald aims at Kennedy and hits and kills
Connally, who is standing right next to Kennedy, Oswald is guilty of the
intentional killing of Connally. However, there are some situations
when a so-called specific intent is required. To commit larceny, you
need a specific intent to deprive the possessor of his property.2 1
Therefore, one must focus on the theft as the primary goal of one's
action. The common law approach to attempted crimes is similar. One
must have the specific intent to kill. For example, if Oswald, aiming and
shooting at Kennedy, misses Connally, he would not be guilty of
attempted homicide against Connally. German law is a little broader in
its analysis of the intention required for attempted crimes. Under the
principle of dolus eventualis,22 German courts would probably convict
Oswald in the latter scenario if Oswald "took into consideration" and
"made his personal peace" with the death of Connally before he pulled
the trigger.

23

The only group of scholars whom we should expect explicitly and
consciously to be committed to the principle of double effect are the
philosophers-the "just war" theorists.2 4 After all, the principle comes
19. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
20. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, § 32(2).
21. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 36-37 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000)
(1978).
22. Id.
at 445-49. Dolus eventualisis a "particular subjective posture" toward a given result. Id.
at 445. There are multiple tests for this particular posture which include "being 'indifferent to the
result' [or] 'being reconciled' with the result as a possible cost of attaining one's goal." Id.at 445-46
(footnotes omitted).
23. See id.
at 445-49.
24. Walzer accepts and strengthens this principle. See WALZER, supra note 4, at 152-54
(discussing double effect).
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out of their tradition. Aquinas is the key figure in the emergence of
both just war theory and the doctrine of double effect. It comes as a
major surprise, therefore, that McMahan rejects the principle under
discussion and opines that "most of the eminent philosophers" have also
25
rejected it.
What is important for him-and supposedly for his "eminent
colleagues" -is avoiding "the killing of the innocent, whether their
deaths are intended or not.",26 Formulating the issue in this way brings
into focus the conflict between consequentialists and subjectivists in
approaching the law of war. For consequentialist just war theorists, all
that matters is how many "good people" die as the cost of achieving
"the good" of going to war. The good people are those who are
innocent, normally those identified as civilians, prisoners of war, or hors
de combat.27 The "benefit" achieved by the war is presumably the
realization or pursuit of the cause that justifies the use of violent force.
This is simply another version of cost/benefit analysis. The cost is the
death of innocent people. The benefit is the possibility of realizing a
just cause. Whether the military action is justified or not depends on
this cost/benefit calculus.
The subjectivist skews the scale toward the killing of more civilians
by introducing the factor of the commander's intention. If that
intention is sound, namely that the primary purpose is to kill combatants
or to pursue a military target, then the action is justified so long as the
costs to civilians are not disproportionate or excessive.28 Consider, for
example, the blowing up of a bridge located near a school. If the focus
of the action is to prevent enemy troops from advancing, the death of
school children is acceptable, provided there are not "too many" of
them. Of course, no one knows how many is too many, but the number
is clearly more than if we were to apply a straight cost/benefit analysis.
In the latter case, the question would be twofold: (1) what is the military
value of blowing up the bridge; and (2) what is the societal cost of the
loss of innocent children? If this is the choice, and if we value human
life in warfare as much as we do in ordinary domestic legal disputes, it is
hard to imagine how we could justify even the death of a single child.
Let us think a little more in depth about how one evaluates the
costs and the benefits of blowing up the bridge. To be sure, the relevant
factors are inconvenience to the enemy army and whether the net result
will be to save civilian lives on "our" side. Notice, I have not referred to
the lives of combatants on either side of the cost/benefit calculus. This

25. MCMAHAN, HOURANI LEcTuREs, supra note 3.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 16.
28. C' Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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is a troubling issue. Suppose the commander argued, "Look, I am sorry
that we have to kill the children, but it saves a lot of our troops who
otherwise would have had to storm the enemy lines and expose
themselves to deadly fire." This sounds like a relevant factor, but there
is something amiss here. Would it make sense to value "our" troops on
one side of the equation and not the enemy combatants on the other
side? Yet the whole point of the war is to destroy the enemy army, so
how could the high cost to enemy troops weigh against the military
action?
There are other aspects of McMahan's argument that would lead
him-much to my dismay-to overvalue enemy troops in our
cost/benefit analysis of military action. It would depend, in principle, he
would argue, on whether they represent the just side or the unjust side
of the war. 29 If our commander represents the just side, then our troops
count for more than do the enemy troops. If we are the unjust side, then
the "just" enemy troops should count more than ours should. This way
of looking at war-as though it was a sporting competition and we were
neutral observers -reveals a fundamental moral blindness about the
nature of the deadly activity at stake.
I should add that, for epistemic rather than principled reasons,
McMahan deviates from his strict commitment to "just war theory" and
approaches the principles ordinarily accepted in the law of war.3 ° In the
heat of battle, he claims, it is too hard to know which side is just.
Therefore, he is willing, in the situation of incomplete knowledge, to
assume the moral equivalence of civilians on both sides. 31 But these
epistemic considerations hardly justify treating combatants on both
sides as morally equivalent. We favor our own men and women in
uniform, not because their side is just or unjust, but simply because they
are our soldiers and they are acting in the name of our country. This is
not a question of justice. It is an expression of loyalty, the breach of
32
which can generate both moral and criminal liability for treason.
The difficulties of cost/benefit analysis in the law of war should
make us appreciate the doctrine of double effect, which would dispense,
at first blush, with the need to evaluate the military target. So long as
the commander's intention was to strike enemy troops or a military
target, his actions would be presumptively legitimate. Only if the
collateral damage is excessive and the commander knows that it is

29. MCMAHAN, HOURANI LECTURES, supra note 3. This follows from the nature of "just war."
C. WALZER, supra note 4, at 229.
30. McMAHAN, HOURANI LECTURES, supra note 3.
31. Seeid.
32. On the morality of loyalty, see generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON
THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS (1993).
On loyalty and treason, see generally George P.
Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611 (2004).
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33
excessive could there be an issue of his personal criminal liability.
Under the relevant provision of the Rome Statute, criminal liability
presupposes knowledge that the military action will cause "incidental
' 34
loss of life or injury to civilians" and that the cost is "excessive. "
Indirectly, the value of the military target becomes relevant because the
notion of excessive harm depends, in the final analysis, on balancing the
value of the target and the damage to civilian life.
I think it would be fair to say that, under this standard, if there
were some plausible military advantage in taking out the bridge, the
"incidental" death of at least some children would be acceptable. The
killing of children would not be acceptable, however, under a
straightforward balancing scheme that places no added value on the
lives and other interests of our own troops.
In the final analysis, without the doctrine of double effect, the use
of deadly force in military campaigns would have to be ruled out any
time it imposed a substantial danger to innocent lives. Perhaps that is
the right result, but it is not a result we can live with in a world in which
wars are sometimes considered legitimate.

III.

JUSTIFYING THE CONVENTIONS OF WAR

The Conventions of War consist of a large number of rules that
make sense largely within the ambit of armed conflict.
The
architectonic distinction is between jus ad bellum and jus inbello.35 The
former governs the right to go to war, and the latter regulates the
conduct of war. Neither has influence on the other. The implication of
this rigid classification is that if state A wrongfully attacks state B, the
soldiers of state B must conform to jus inbello exactly as do the soldiers
of state A. That is, the status of defending against an unjust aggressor
does not change the rules of the game. If the use of poison is prohibited
under jus in bello, it remains prohibited to both sides, regardless of who
started the war. 36 Indeed, it could not be any other way. Even if the just
side could derogate from the rules of jus in bello, we would have a
problem determining how much they could derogate. Could they use a
lot of poison or just a little? Just when they were in dire straights? Or
all the time? It is obvious that no tenable law of war could make these
kinds of distinctions. Perhaps the reasons are partly epistemic-that is,
33. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; see also Rome Statute, supra note 11, art.
8(2)(b)(iv).
34. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
36. Cf, e.g., Hague Convention [No. II] with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
art. 23, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (stating it is prohibited "[t]o employ poison or
poisoned arms"); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, No. 2318. This
follows from the nature ofjus in bello. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 333-34.
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it is too hard to decide for sure whose cause is just, and if so, how great
the deviations from equal application of the law should be.
The structural independence of jus in bello from jus ad bellum
resembles the postulate that distributive justice should not influence
corrective justice. The rich are entitled to the same treatment in
particular cases as are the poor. The general point is that prior history
does not control the analysis of the present transaction-in the theory of
justice or in the theory of warfare.
The consequence of war conventions is that soldiers fight and
civilians remain on the sidelines. Both sets of participants are equal but
in different ways. Friendly and enemy combatants are equal in the
sense that the lives of neither are protected under the law of war against
conventional methods of killing.3 7 Civilians on both sides are equal in
the sense they are protected, 38 although they remain subject to
considerable harm under the principle of double effect. 39 Thus, the law
of war consists of a rigid system of classifications that are designed to
keep the war between armed professionals. Of course, it does not work
out this way in practice because modern military campaigns inevitably
endanger the lives of large numbers of civilians.
Philosophers like McMahan have undertaken to question whether
any of this killing in warfare is morally justified or whether it can be said
to be an act of justice. The usual method of argument is to begin with
justificatory techniques in domestic law and then try to extrapolate the
same principles to group conflict expressed in the clash of opposing
armies.40 There are three possible lines of argument. Let us follow
these lines of argument, systematically, with regard to the possible
claims of justification available in domestic criminal law: first, that the
conflict was between parties who consented; second, that the conflict
arose out of necessity or that it was the lesser of evils; and third, that the
conflict arose when at least one party acted in self-defense.
A. Consent
There might be some rare instances in which wars take place
between consenting adults. In this case, one might argue that war is like
a duel writ large. Willing participants enter the battlefield; some kill
each other and some survive. They fight by the rules of the game.
37.

See supra note 16.

38. See Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War arts. 3, 147, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T.3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.

39. See discussion of double effect supra Part I.
40. See McMahan, Prdcis, supra note 3, at 316 ("Ibelieve that the morality of action in war is
continuous with the morality of individual action outside the context of war, and in particular that
killing in war has to be justified by reference to the same moral principles that govern individual acts
of killing outside the context of war, especially the principles governing killing in self- or otherdefense.").
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Society has done a better job outlawing duels than it has controlling
the impulse to go to war. I am not sure why. Perhaps the reason is that
duels exist between citizens of the same polity; their government has an
interest in avoiding unnecessary killings. Polities fight wars against
aliens whose lives never seem to be equal to our own. There is no
neutral polity with the prestige and power necessary to insist upon
international litigation to settle disputes in place of a resort to arms.
B. Necessity or Lesser Evils
Modern legal systems generally accept the principle that to avoid
an imminent risk of harm, it is permissible to violate criminal
prohibitions. The necessary condition is that the expected benefit of the
violation exceeds its expected costs. This is called necessity as a
justification or lesser evils.41 There is great reluctance to recognize this
principle in cases of homicide. However, assuming the principle applies
to causing death, it would be permissible to kill one person to save two.
Therefore, it might be possible that fighting wars ultimately saves lives.
This is a little hard to believe because as litigation replaced dueling,
international arbitration could settle international conflicts without the
loss of life.
Yet, the argument of saving lives might work in the case of specific
attacks in the course of a war. For example, the argument for using the
atomic bomb in Hiroshima is that it ended the war without an invasion
of the mainland-a campaign that would have cost many more lives.
Again, the problem in wartime is deciding the appropriate weight to be
assigned to various groups of persons. In the Hiroshima case, there are
four relevant groups: (1) American soldiers; (2) American civilians; (3)
Japanese soldiers; and (4) Japanese civilians. The gross calculus of
saving lives should pay attention to which of these groups would be
affected by dropping the bomb instead of invading the mainland.

41.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962); FLETCHER, supra note 21, at 818-19. Necessity is also

an excuse. See id.

416

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 48

Suppose the casualties are as follows:
1. American civilians

Bomb
Invasion
2. American soldiers
Bomb
Invasion
3. Japanese civilians
Bomb
Invasion
4. Japanese soldiers
Bomb
Invasion

0
0
0
40,000
74,000
5,000
1,000
30,000

Based on these figures, the bomb and the invasion each result in a
total cost of 75,000 lives. This, however, would not be the right
calculation under the law of war. Damage to civilians should be
minimized as a matter of principle, which makes the invasion the correct
option. Nevertheless, if President Roosevelt's adviser reported these
figures, the President would note that the cost of the bomb to
Americans would be zero, while the cost of the invasion would be 40,000
American lives. There is little doubt that the President would discount
the foreign lives, whether civilian or combatant, and overvalue the lives
of Americans. I am not sure that this would be morally wrong. After
all, the president is commander-in-chief of the United States military
forces; his primary duty is to protect American lives.
Using the principle of lesser evils requires a neutral point of view
on the conflicting interests at stake. In a case of armed conflict, neither
side is neutral. It would be absurd to expect them to be. Yet it is hard
to avoid the application of lesser evils in the law governing the use of
force. Most commentators accept the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention.4 2 What was the justification for America sending troops
into Somalia or NATO's bombing of Bosnia? The argument had to be
that the benefits exceeded the cost. The intervention saved lives,
preserved stability, and contributed to the welfare of the affected
countries. However, that argument is a bit problematic under the
United Nations Charter Article 51, which recognizes self-defense as the
only legitimate ground for using military force.4 3 Whatever the legal
42. See GEORGE

P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID ORLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE

IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 129-54 (2008).

43. U.N Charter art. 51; see FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 42, at 129-54. (offering what I
believe is the first serious argument about reconciling humanitarian intervention with the United
Nations Charter).
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documents may say, international lawyers instinctively accept the
principle of lesser evils.
The question remains, however, whether the principle of lesser
evils can justify killing in warfare.
In the end, the following
considerations count against it. First, for good reason, domestic legal
systems balk at justifying homicide by appealing to lesser evils. To
justify killing in this way is to use the victim as a means to an end, thus
violating our duty to respect all persons as ends in themselves. Second,
even if homicide were justifiable, there would be no neutral way in cases
of armed conflict to decide the relative weight of lives in the embattled
nations. Third, if there were a neutral point of view about conflicting
nations, there is still a supervening principle in the case of armed
conflict that requires that soldiers be sacrificed before civilians.
C Self-Defense
In light of the difficulties that arise in the appeal to consent and
lesser evils, it is not surprising that self-defense is the most popular
principle of domestic law invoked to justify international armed conflict.
As noted, the U.N. Charter recognized the "inherent right" of all
member states to "individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs.",44 McMahan also appeals to the analogy between cases
of self-defense between individuals and self-defense as a rationale for
killing in international armed conflict. 45 Although I have written at
length about this analogy,46 I wish to argue here that the analogy has
serious limitations and that even if it holds, defensive wars cannot be
understood as instances of justice or cases of "just war."
In order to be clear about the analogy, it is helpful to review some
basic features of self-defense, considered either as a moral or a legal
doctrine. For starters, self-defense is a justification and not an excuse.47
There is a long history on this issue, which is not worth repeating here.4
The implication of the justification is twofold. First, the defender is
acquitted and there is no residual civil liability, though the difference in
49
the burden of proof might permit civil liability after an acquittal.
Second, if the defender is justified, the other side cannot respond with
the justifiable use of force.
Both of these principles are accepted in international law as
44. U.N. Charter art. 51.
45. See McMahan, Pr6cis, supra note 3, at 316.
46. SeegenerallyFLETCHER& OHLIN, supra note 42, at 129-54.
47. For my first and probably most influential article in this area, see generally George P.
Fletcher, Proportionalityand the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory,
8 ISR. L. REV. 367 (1973).

48. See generally id
49. See George P. Fletcher, Justice for All, Twice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1996, at A21 (discussing
the trials of Bernhard Goetz).
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applied to states and as applied to individuals under the Rome Statute.
Specifically, Article 31(1)(c) seems to recognize self-defense as a
justification for committing war crimes.5 0 This point is subject to some
doubt, however, because the language of the Rome Statute does not
recognize the distinction between justification and excuse, and Article
31(1) itself includes a m6lange of considerations called "grounds for
excluding criminal responsibility."'"
In analyzing the justification of self-defense, there are always two
sides to consider: (1) the criteria bearing on the attack; and (2) the
criteria justifying the defensive use of force. Consider the relevant
issues, one by one.
1. The Attack
In order to use the self-defense justification, the attack must be
overt, imminent, and unlawful. Each of these criteria is analyzed below.
a. The Attack Must Be Overt
As the U.N. Charter stipulates, "if an armed attack occurs," the
member states may exercise their inherent right of self-defense. 52 It is
not enough that the defender believe that an armed attack is
underway.53 It must actually be underway. It is not entirely clear why
this is so. I think the best reason is that justification for the use of force
must be visible to the international community as a whole. It should not
be enough for the defending nation to claim that it "believes" the other
side has weapons of mass destruction, as the United States claimed
about Iraq, and that it was about to use them, which the U.S did not
claim. 54 The claim of "belief" is too easy to manufacture. As a matter
of principle, there should be hard evidence, visible to all.
b. The Attack Must Be Imminent
The attack must threaten immediate harm and the defense must
follow hard on the threat. A good example is Israel's response to the
threat of Arab invasion in June 1967. In contrast, there is something
odd about the relationship between the United States congressional
authorization to use force against Iraq in October 2002 and the
President's decision to take action in March 2003. 55 Congress
50.
51.
52.

53.
suggests
54.
55.

Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 31(1)(c).
Id.art.31(1).
U.N. Charter art. 51.

But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962). A reading of the Model Penal Code § 3.04
it is enough that the defender believe that the attack is occurring. See id.
S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8,2002).
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116
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authorized the use of force, in part, to "defend the national security of
the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. ' 56 The
threat could not have been so serious if the U.S could wait another five
months before acting.
c. The Attack Must Be Unlawful
All domestic legal systems assume that the attack must be unlawful.
This is the reason that in any particular domestic conflict only one side
can be justified. Simultaneous cases of reciprocal aggression are
logically possible, but very unlikely. Typically, one side attacks first.
The first aggressor acts unlawfully and the defender's response is
justified.
The same is assumed to be true of international conflict. Even if
we leave aside the issue of collective self-defense under treaties of
mutual assistance, one country could attack in the south and the other in
the north. They would both be aggressors. In this situation, the
application of the "unlawful attack" criterion would be inappropriate.
For good or for ill, Article 51 does not mention the requirement of
unlawful attack. 57 Any attack will trigger the inherent right of selfdefense. This is a problematic feature of the U.N. Charter, but perhaps
it conforms properly to the law of war. Under the principles of jus ad
bellum, the question of who attacked first has some relevance, but once
the war is launched and the principles of jus in bello come into play, it
does not matter whether the original attack was lawful or not. The
analogy to the domestic law of self-defense breaks down at this point.
When the "state of war" applies, it confounds the attempt to use
the model of self-defense as a guide to legitimate action in warfare. For
example, Israel defends its attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1980 on the
5 8
ground that there was an ongoing state of war between the countries.
Therefore, there was arguably no Israeli aggression against Iraq, just
another battle in the ongoing war. A version of this argument is offered
on behalf of the American invasion of Iraq in 2002, namely, the ongoing
state of war initiated in the First Gulf War.59 These claims do not seem
very plausible, but at the other extreme one might argue that every
battle should be considered on its own terms. In analyzing the battle of
Gettysburg, for example, it arguably does not matter what happened in
Star. 1498,1501 (2002).
56. Id.

57. U.N. Charter art. 51.
58. See Anthony D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike Against the OsiraqReactor: A Retrospective, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259, 259-64 (1996); see alsoThe Osirak Attack: Israeli Statement of 8 June
1981, http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/TheOsirakAttack.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2009); S.C.
Res. 487, U.N. Doc. SJRES/487 (June 19, 1981).
59. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Joint Resolution of Congress,
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116 Stat. 1498, 1498-99 (2002).
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Charleston Harbor two years before. Yet this standpoint is also
controversial. Battles within wars do not raise issues of jus ad bellunr,
that is, if the battle occurs within an ongoing war, either side may attack
the other without breaching the laws of war.
2. The Defense
In order to use the self-defense justification, the defensive use of
force must be analyzed according to whether the defense is an
intentional or knowing response to an attack, whether the defense is
necessary, and whether it is proportionate to the provoking attack.
a. The Defense Must Be an Intentionalor Knowing Response to the
Attack
The requirement that the defense be an intentional or knowing
response to the attack is controverted in the theory of criminal law.
Paul Robinson made his career by arguing for "objective" self-defense,
based on the theory that if the defender happens to use force against an
aggressor, there is no relevant social harm. 60 In fact, most legal systems
require that the defensive force be knowingly responsive to the attack.
Some people subscribe to Robinson's theory in international
conflict, as exemplified in the search for weapons of mass destruction
after the invasion of Iraq. Many people believed that finding the
weapons, regardless of whether the invading forces knew they existed
before the attack, could justify the invasion retrospectively. The better
view, and one in line with the requirement of public evidence of the
attack, would be that only a knowing response could qualify as a
defensive war under the United Nations Charter.
b. The Defense Must Be Necessary
The paradigm case of necessity is a person's use of judo to block a
kick or a punch. To say that the judo throw is necessary is actually to
make three interrelated claims: (1) the defensive means are preventing
the realization of the attack; (2) the defensive means will succeed; and
(3) the defensive means appear to be the least costly method or at least
one of less costly methods of preventing the attack.
All three of these factors become problematic in the law of war.
First, in the days in which the infantry began the war by marching across
the enemy's border, the foreign army could stop them with physical
force that would resemble the judo throw. However, that kind of war
60. See generally Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite
for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975); see also George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for
the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293 (1975).

20091

Is Justice Relevant to the Law of War?

has not occurred in centuries. Wars begin today with the shelling of
enemy targets. They result in death even before there is a chance for a
defensive response. In what sense, then, is the response necessary?
The response cannot prevent the first attack. The most it can do is
prevent a second attack, but the second attack-say, after Pearl
Harbor-may be very remote in time. If remote, the second attack
hardly qualifies as an imminent attack. Even if this were not a problem,
the mentality of warfare permits actions that are in fact tit for tat, not
necessarily defensive in nature. The way to explain this, perhaps, is that
after the first attack, the "state of war" applies and the criteria of selfdefense become irrelevant.
Second, the relevance of possible success is a hotly debated issue in
the law of war. The strategy of reciprocal nuclear deterrence would not
keep the peace unless both sides were willing, in effect, to engage in
pointless retaliation. This makes very little sense as self-defense.
Finally, the requirement of necessity implies that the means chosen
are the least costly alternative. For this factor to make sense after the
first attack is completed, it would have to be adapted to the purposes of
warfare. When war is declared, the purpose is to defeat the enemy, and
arguably, the victorious army should use the least costly means of
accomplishing that objective. However, by delving into the details of
"least costly" alternatives, problems arise in considering the cost/benefit
analysis, as demonstrated above in the Hiroshima example.61
c. The Defense Must Be Proportionate
This factor is readily misunderstood in both domestic and
international law. In domestic law, the requirement of proportionality
implies that there are some attacks that one must suffer, rather than
respond in a way that is too costly to the aggressor. For example, if a
thief is running away with my laptop computer, including all of my files,
without backup, it might be necessary to shoot him to protect my
interests. But shooting to kill would arguably be disproportionate to the
attack. Whether proportionality should ever be considered as a
limitation of self-defense is hotly contested in domestic law, particularly
in the German legal system.62
In international law, the problem arises in various ways. If the
issue is submission to foreign conquest, there is arguably no restraint of
proportionality. This is the problem that Walzer and others call "dire"
or "supreme emergency., 63 But this is a matter on which reasonable
people disagree. Whether it is better to be red than dead, most states in
61.
62.
63.

Seediscussion supra Part I1.B.
Fletcher, supra note 47, at 381-87.
WALZER, supra note 4, at 251-68.
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the contemporary legal order would use any means at their disposal to
prevent conquest and occupation by foreign powers.
Yet, assume the issue is not ultimate victory or defeat but rather
the response to the first attack. A good example is Israel's response to
Hezbollah's shelling in the Second Lebanese War. In the summer of
2006, some accused Israel of engaging in a disproportionate response by
bombing various military targets in Northern Lebanon. 64 The better
question would have been whether the bombing was necessary, and if
so, for what military objective.
Much confusion arises because the requirements of necessity and
proportionality are used interchangeably. The unfortunate consequence
of this confusion is that there seems to be something like an antiescalation requirement in local wars. A certain amount of shooting and
killing is permissible, but only so long as it conforms roughly to the level
set by the other side. This notion of proportionality has its origin not in
the model of self-defense but in the theory of punishment and the
requirements of "just desert." The enemy should not face more of a
counter-threat than it "deserves" based on its aggressive actions.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE RATIONALE OF WAR AND THE PROBLEM OF
JUSTICE

The question of desert gives rise to the task of assessing "just war
theory" in general, namely to justify killing in warfare as a matter of
justice. The invocation of justice in this context is wrong, largely
because the argument misconceives the nature of self-defense as a
justification for going to war.
The classic position in "just war theory" is that a war may be fought
to rectify a wrong. Rectifying a wrong is a well-known form of justice corrective justice. If the purpose is to punish a wrongdoer, then one
might say that it is an application of retributive justice. The desire to
link justice with warfare and reliance on the model of self-defense leads
to statements typical of the principles articulated in "just war theory,"
such as: "A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. For
example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be
'
a just cause. 65
64.

See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL/LEBANON UNDER FIRE: HIZBULLAH'S AT ACKS

ON NORTHERN ISRAEL 8 (2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/assetlMDEO2/025/2006/en/domMDE020252006en.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL/LEBANON: DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION
OR "COLLATERAL DAMAGE"?
ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 3-6 (2006),

see also
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDEl8/007/2006/en/dom-MDE180072006en.pdf;
Kevin Sullivan, Rights Group Accuses Hezbollah of 'Indiscriminate'Killing, WASH. POST, Sept. 15,
2006, at A15, available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2006/09/14/
AR2006091401542.html.
65. Principles of the Just War, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/ustwar.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009).
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Yet, as argued in the preceding analysis of the six factors bearing
on self-defense, the purpose of self-defense in domestic law is neither to
rectify a wrong nor to punish the aggressor. Its purpose is exclusively to
resist the attack. That is the reason why the factor of time becomes so
important. If the defensive force is too early or too late it cannot satisfy
the requirement of a necessary response to an imminent attack.
The proof that self-defense is not a form of corrective justice is that
a successful act of defense has no bearing whatsoever on the deserved
punishment of the aggressor. Some philosophers have claimed to the
contrary, largely because they have insisted on the confusion of selfdefense and punishment. Robert Nozick once claimed, for example,
that if the defender successfully resists the aggressor, the act of
resistance should be considered something like a "down payment" on
the deserved punishment.6 6
But this represents a deep
misunderstanding of self-defense. The defender does not act in place of
a court imposing punishment. The criteria of proportionality is
different. In self-defense, proportionality is a limiting criterion for the
use of necessary force. In cases of punishment, the sanction should fit
the crime and in this sense be proportional. Just desert has no bearing
on self-defense, as evidenced by the general recognition of self-defense
against excused aggressors who should not be punished at law for their
acts.
The fundamental and recurrent mistake of "just war theory" is to
assume that wars can rectify wrongs or punish wrongdoers. This is a
necessary assumption in the structure of the theory in order to provide a
nexus for the criteria of corrective and retributive justice. This is a
terrible misconception and an unfortunate invitation to the reckless use
of arms, such as the invitation of Iraq to punish Sadaam Hussein for
having conquered Kuwait some years before. At a philosophical level,
the definitive rebuff to this conception of war was delivered in 1797 by
Immanuel Kant in his great work on legal theory. 67 Kant states, "No
war of independent states against each other can be a punitive war
(bellum punitivum). For punishment occurs only in the relation of a
superior (imperantis) to those subject to68him (subditum), and states do
not stand in that relation to each other."
Kant is absolutely right on the nature of punishment, as the leading
theorists of punishment now recognize. 69 The starting point for thinking
66.

See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 364 (1981).

claim, see
67.

FLETCHER,
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supra note 6, at 239-40.

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 153 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge

Univ. Press 1993) (1797).
68. Id
69. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principlesof Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 2008) (recognizing the
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about international law is the equality of all states. They are not created
equal but they are constituted equal by the legal system. If that is true,
then no state can impose punishment or any other instrument of justice
on another state. Justice requires a neutral hierarchically superior
judge.
"Just war theory" derives from an earlier time; one more
influenced by the notion that some states are on the side of God and
others are not. There may be justice in the wars by the Hebrews in the
Old Testament, and there may be justice in the wars fought by the
Catholic Church to spread their religion. However, to reveal the debt of
"just war theory" to this outdated vision of international order is enough
to refute it.

